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Employment Research
impact of licensing on hourly wages is
much smaller than in the United States.
The major empirical findings in
Licensing Occupations are summarized
in Table 1. Given these results of the
labor market impacts of licensing,
other forms of regulation, such as
certification, are suggested. Alternative
forms of occupational regulation may
provide consumers with more choice
than licensing and reduce the potential
monopoly impacts of licensing in the
labor market. In order to better monitor
the economic impacts of licensing, data
on this form of regulation should be
provided to academics and policymakers
in the major national labor market data
sources, such as the Current Population
Survey. With more data and analysis,
the public, workers, and policymakers
can more accurately assess whether
occupational licensing is ensuring quality
or restricting competition.
Morris M. Kleiner is a professor at the
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and the
Industrial Relations Center at the University
of Minnesota–Twin Cities.
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T

he greatest opposition to
privatizing a firm usually comes from the
firm’s own employees, who are fearful
of wage cuts and job losses. Workers’
apprehensions about privatization are
consistent with standard economic
analyses, whereby new private owners
reduce the firm’s labor costs in response
to harder budget constraints and stronger
profit-related incentives. Discussions of
this “efficiency effect” of privatization,
however, implicitly assume that the
firm’s output remains constant or at
least does not increase. But lower costs
may increase the firm’s market share as
well as total quantity demanded for the
industry, and the new private owners may
be more entrepreneurial in marketing,
innovation, and entering new markets. In
such cases, the firm’s output will tend to
rise, and if this “scale effect” dominates,
then privatization could cause a net
employment increase.
The implications of privatization
for wages are also ambiguous. New
owners may reduce wages as part of
a general cost-cutting policy, but if
the firm expands, it may have to offer
higher wages to attract new workers.
New private owners may also be more
likely to adopt skill-biased technologies,
resulting in a compositional shift toward
higher-paid workers. Depending on the
relative strength of such factors, wages
may either rise or fall as a result of
privatization.
Not only does theoretical analysis
fail to provide definitive predictions
on the wage and employment effects
of privatization, but also the existing
empirical evidence is both scant and
inconclusive, containing both negative
and positive estimates of the effects on
workers. Therefore, the Upjohn Institute,
in collaboration with partners from
Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh
and the Central European University

Labor Project in Budapest, has recently
undertaken an empirical analysis of
the effects of privatization on the wage
bill, employment, and wage rates of
firms in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and
Ukraine—countries where thousands of
businesses were privatized in a relatively
short period of time during the 1990s.
These four countries had varied success
with privatization reforms. Hungary was
considered one of the most successful,
Russia and Ukraine were less successful,
and Romania was somewhere in the
middle.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of
the average real wage bill and percent
private ownership in each country. At
this aggregate level of analysis, a strong
negative correlation is evident in all
four countries, which would seem to
corroborate workers’ fears and most
economists’ expectations. However,
several other events that could affect
the wage bill occurred during the 1990s
(including macroeconomic shocks and
market liberalization), and the firms
selected for privatization may have been
declining for extraneous reasons. To
deal with these potentially confounding
factors and estimate the causal effects
of privatization on workers, the project
has analyzed microdata on firms that
have been linked over time. The methods
applied to estimate the privatization
effects at the firm level draw upon some
of those used in evaluations of labor
market training programs in the United
States.
Privatization Programs and
Implications for Workers
The methods and tempos of large
enterprise privatization differed quite
significantly across the four countries in
this study. Hungary got off to an early
start in ownership transformation and
maintained a consistent case-by-case
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Figure 1 Evolution of Average Real Wage Bill and Private Ownership
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NOTE: The graphs show an index of the average real wage bill and percent of majority private firms on the
vertical axis, calculated from our data. The real wage bill is set at 100 in 1989 in Hungary and 1992 for
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.

method throughout the transition. Unlike
many other countries, there were no
significant incentives given to workers
to acquire shares in their companies,
nor was there a mass distribution of
shares aided by vouchers. Hungarian
privatization thus resulted in very little
worker ownership (involving only
about 250 firms), very little dispersed
ownership, and instead significant
managerial ownership and highly
concentrated block-holdings, many of
them foreign. Although the process
appeared at times to be slow and gradual,
in fact it was completed earlier than in
most other East European countries.
In Romania, by contrast, the early
attempts to mimic voucher programs
and sell individual firms produced few
results, and privatization really began
only in late 1993, first with the program
of Management and Employee Buyouts,
and then with the mass privatization of
1995–1996. The consequences of these
programs were large-scale employee
ownership and dispersed shareholding
by the general population, with little



foreign involvement. Beginning in 1997,
foreign investors became more involved,
and blocks of shares were sold to both
foreigners and domestic entities. The
result was a mixture of several types
of ownership and a moderate speed
compared to Hungary.
Russia’s and Ukraine’s earliest
privatization experiences have some
similarities to the “spontaneous” period in
Hungary, as the central planning system
dissolved in the late 1980s and decisionmaking power devolved to managers
and work collectives. In both countries,
the initial consequence was large-scale
ownership by managers and workers and
some block-holding by domestic entities.
Subsequently, privatization through sales
became more common, secondary trading
increased concentration, and foreigners
made partial inroads.
These differences in privatization
policy design could affect the impact of
privatization on employment and wage
outcomes through different impacts
on the efficiency and scale effects of
privatization. Worker-owners are likely

to oppose labor-saving restructuring, for
example, and they are unlikely to have
incentives or resources to expand output.
Outside block-holders, on the other hand,
should favor cost-saving restructuring,
particularly foreign investors with access
to management skills, new technologies,
and financing; they also are more likely
to respond to opportunities for expansion.
Outsiders with small shareholdings
may also benefit from efficiency
improvements and scale expansion, but
they are unlikely to influence the firm’s
behavior. Therefore, both the efficiency
and scale effects of privatization are
likely to be smallest for domestic
owners in countries where insider and
mass privatization predominated, larger
in cases where domestic outsiders
acquired blocks of shares, and largest
for privatization to foreign investors.
Because these mechanisms are offsetting,
however, the relative magnitudes of the
effects of different types of privatization
on workers are ambiguous.
Estimated Effects of Privatization
A first finding from detailed analyses
of the firm-level data in this project is
that, even before privatization, there are
significant differences between firms
that are privatized later and those that
remain state-owned. Across the four
countries in the analysis, the direction of
the differences of firms later privatized to
domestic investors is sometimes positive
and sometimes negative. But the foreign
differences are quite consistent, as firms
that will be foreign-owned have higher
wage bills, employment levels, and
average wages than either pre-domestic
firms or firms that always remain stateowned in all four countries. Moreover,
not only the levels but the growth rates
of these outcome variables display large
preprivatization differences. These results
imply that there may be some selection
biases in the privatization process,
and that simple comparisons across
ownership types may be misleading. The
empirical estimates of the privatization
effects in this project therefore control
for any fixed differences among firms
and differing trend growth rates that may
affect the probability of privatization, and
whether the new owners are domestic or
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foreign investors. We compare alternative
estimators using several specification
tests, including variants of the “preprogram” test, which measures selection
bias of an estimator as the difference in
the dependent variable prior to treatment
between the treated and comparison
groups. In the privatization context,
this test must be evaluated before the
privatization year to avoid possible
contamination through anticipatory
effects.
The results from these estimations
imply that, on average, privatization has
had little effect on the wage bill. If the
wage bill represents a summary indicator
of worker welfare, the firm-level analysis
in this project does not support the
common belief that privatization hurt
workers. When new domestic owners are
distinguished from foreign investors, the
results for the former tend to be similar
to the overall private results, as domestic
owners dominate in most privatized
companies. The results also provide no
support for the widespread fear of foreign
owners; on the contrary, they provide
strong evidence that foreign owners
increased the wage bill in the two Central
and East European countries in our study,
and in the two formerly Soviet republics
the effect seems to be zero in the most
pessimistic case.
These results for the wage bill can be
decomposed into component parts, as
shown in Table 1 for employment and
in Table 2 for wages. The tables show
two alternative specifications that differ
only on whether firm-specific trends
are controlled for in the estimation
procedure; in both cases firm fixed effects
are included. The effects of domestic
privatization on either employment or
wages differ very little across the two
specifications, in no case showing large
negative effects. The largest in magnitude
are the implied 3–5 percent reduction in
wages in domestically privatized firms in
Hungary and Russia.
The estimated effects of foreign
privatization are positive for both
employment and wages in both
specifications in every country. The
inclusion of firm-specific trends does
make a substantial difference to the
magnitude and statistical significance
of the results, with substantial and
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Table 1 Employment Effects of Privatization
Hungary
Romania
No trends
Domestic
Foreign
With trends
Domestic
Foreign

Russia

Ukraine

–0.030
(0.035)

0.187**
(0.026)

–0.007
(0.006)

0.017
(0.009)

0.428**
(0.073)

0.285**
(0.086)

0.152**
(0.043)

0.135
(0.077)

0.002
(0.024)

–0.030
(0.017)

0.005
(0.004)

–0.006
(0.008)

0.154**
(0.050)

0.000
(0.068)

0.043
(0.041)

0.030
(0.070)

NOTE: Foreign = 1 if the majority of the firm’s shares are owned by foreigners in year t – 1.
Domestic = 1 if the firm was private in year t – 1 but not majority-owned by foreigners. “No
trends” specification includes firm fixed effects and industry-year interactions; “with trends”
adds individual firm trends. Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in
parentheses. * = significant at the 5% level. ** = significant at the 1% level.

significant impacts remaining for
employment in Hungary and for wages
in Hungary and Romania. Specification
tests are somewhat inconclusive about
whether it is best to include the firmspecific trends on statistical grounds,
so the results are somewhat ambiguous
as to whether the benefits of foreign
privatization for employment and
wages are uniformly strongly positive
or sometimes merely weakly positive.
In all cases, however, the data reject the
proposition that the effects are strongly
negative.

Efficiency and Scale Effects
The results from this research
suggest—contrary to the expectations
of many workers, policymakers, and
economists—that average wages and
employment have not been substantially
reduced by either domestic or foreign
privatization. As discussed earlier,
however, privatization may affect firm
scale and efficiency in ways that produce
opposing effects on workers. The lack of
negative consequences could result from
new private owners failing to improve
efficiency, or it could result from scale

Table 2 Wage Effects of Privatization
Hungary
Romania
No trends
Domestic
Foreign
With trends
Domestic
Foreign

Russia

Ukraine

–0.027
(0.015)

–0.023
(0.012)

–0.047**
(0.008)

0.003
(0.011)

0.307**
(0.033)

0.235**
(0.054)

0.244**
(0.064)

0.304**
(0.095)

–0.045**
(0.016)

0.006
(0.013)

–0.032**
(0.007)

–0.004
(0.011)

0.066*
(0.033)

0.116*
(0.057)

0.019
(0.063)

0.079
(0.097)

NOTE: Foreign = 1 if the majority of the firm’s shares are owned by foreigners in year t – 1.
Domestic = 1 if the firm was private in year t – 1 but not majority-owned by foreigners. “No
trends” specification includes firm fixed effects and industry-year interactions; “with trends”
adds individual firm trends. Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in
parentheses. * = significant at the 5% level. ** = significant at the 1% level.
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effects that offset the efficiency effects
of private ownership. To explore these
possibilities, it is useful to decompose the
estimated impact of privatization on the
wage bill into unit labor cost reduction
(efficiency) and output expansion (scale)
effects.1
The results of this decomposition
show a striking regularity: foreign
owners have been much more active in
both dimensions than domestic owners.
Although smaller, the scale effect is
positive in each country for domestic
privatization with the exception of
Russia, where it is negative but small and
statistically insignificant. The efficiency
effect measured as unit labor cost
reduction is positive for all countries and
both ownership forms, although again
it is larger under foreign ownership.
This regularity holds for the scale effect
measured as the effect of privatization
on output and for the efficiency effect
measured as unit labor cost reduction
within each country. The scale effect is
not only positive and significant in each
country for foreign privatization, but
also for domestic privatization with the
exception of Russia, where it is negative
but small and statistically insignificant.
The efficiency effect measured as unit
labor cost reduction is positive for all
countries and both ownership forms,
although again it is larger under foreign
ownership.
The effects vary widely across
countries: while the foreign effects are
similar for Hungary, Romania, and
Ukraine, they are substantially smaller
in Russia. But the domestic pattern
is still more pronounced, as Hungary
and Romania show sizable scale and
efficiency effects of domestic ownership,
while both effects are negligible in Russia
and Ukraine. Thus, the cross-country
domestic wage bill patterns (small
and negative everywhere) mask large
differences in scale and efficiency effects.
Conclusion
Although economic analyses of the
effects of privatization have focused
almost entirely on firm performance, the
greatest political and social controversies
have usually concerned the consequences
for the firm’s employees. In most cases,
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it has been assumed that the employment
and wage effects would be negative,
and workers all around the world have
reacted to the prospect of privatization,
especially that to foreigners, with protests
and strikes. Yet there have been very few
systematic studies of the relationship
between privatization and outcomes
for the firm’s workers, and previous
research has been hampered by small
sample sizes, short time series, and little
ability to control for selection bias. It
has therefore remained unclear whether
workers’ fears of privatization are in fact
warranted.
The new research in this project,
however, finds no evidence of large
systematic negative consequences of
privatization for employment and wages.
In two of the four countries studied, small
negative effects on wages are estimated
for domestic privatization, but they are
indeed quite small (minus 3–5 percent).
By contrast, privatization to foreign
investors produces consistently positive
effects on the wage bill, employment, and
wages in all four countries, regardless
of estimation technique. The precise
magnitudes vary with the econometric
specification, but even in the most
demanding specification for the data,
the foreign results are positive and
sometimes they are large and statistically
significant.
The project also investigates the
two alternative mechanisms through
which privatization may affect outcomes
for workers: efficiency and scale.
The negligible effects of domestic
privatization imply that these effects
are largely offsetting. In Hungary and
Romania, however, the offsetting scale
and efficiency effects have both been
large, while in Russia and Ukraine they
have been small. Foreign privatization
has resulted in much larger efficiency
effects in all four countries, but still
much larger scale effects, resulting in
the increased employment and wages in
foreign-owned firms that we observe after
privatization.
An important caveat is that
privatization may affect other aspects of
worker welfare, including employment
turnover, fringe benefits, and other work
conditions. The data used in the project
do not follow workers who are displaced,

nor do they provide information on the
alternative jobs for workers who are
hired. The project therefore does not
carry out a complete welfare evaluation
of privatization, but it does provide new
information on the effects on the wage
bill, employment, and average wages at
privatized firms, effects that would be
important elements in such an evaluation.
Subject to this caveat, the results of the
project imply that efficiency-enhancing
owners may be good for workers, at
least in terms of average employment
and wage levels. Greater efficiency
helps firms expand sales, reducing the
likelihood of severe distress and raising
labor demand. Workers’ employment and
wage prospects are never systematically
diminished by privatization, and in
some cases—particularly with foreign
ownership—they actually brighten.
Notes
This article is based on Upjohn Institute
Working Paper No. 05-125, “Does
Privatization Hurt Workers? Lessons from
Comprehensive Manufacturing Firm Panel
Data in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and
Ukraine,” by J. David Brown, John S. Earle,
and Almos Telegdy.
1. The wage bill is by definition unit
labor cost times output, and therefore the
proportional effect of privatization on the
wage bill equals the proportional effect on
unit labor cost plus the proportional effect on
output.
John S. Earle is a senior economist at
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research and a professor of economics at
Central European University.

